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Torts-Property Owner's Liability For Injuries to Public Employees
P, a policeman, was injured when he fell into an open excavation on the premises of the defendant church, while investigating for
reported prowlers at night. P recovered damages in a negligence
action and D appealed. Held, reversed, judgment for defendants, a
policeman entering upon private property in the performance of his
duty without express or implied invitation is a mere licensee and
the owner correspondingly owes him no duty except to refrain from
injuring him by active negligence or wilful and wanton conduct.
Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church, 192 N.E.2d 38
(Ohio 1953).
Courts have long been troubled concerning the landowners' and
occupants' duty to public officers and servants who enter upon private
premises in performance of their duties. It is often difficult to
classify such individuals into any of the three broad categories by
which the law determines the status of the one entering upon the
land-trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Since the entry is privileged,
it can be agreed that the public servant is not a trespasser, but the
problem arises in attempting to call him either licensee or invitee.
The distinction is important because the law charges the occupant
with greater duty toward the latter; he must make the premises safe
for the invitee, or at least warn him of any danger of which he, the
owner, knows or has reason to know. The two classes have generally
been differentiated on the theory that the licensee is one who enters
with the possessor's consent, but no more, while the invitee is one
who comes for an economic purpose of the occupant, or at least in
response to an implied invitation and assurance that the premises
have been made safe for him. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 77-78 (2d ed.
1955).
Using the "economic purpose" rule as a guide, courts have
deemed it reasonable to place several kinds of public employees in
the invitee class. The case of Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96
S.W.2d 369 (1936) involved a postman who was injured on private
premises while performing his employment, and the court accorded
him the status of a business visitor, although recovery was denied
on other grounds. Long before even the Paubel holding, it had been
held that providing a direct pecuniary advantage to the occupier was
not a requisite to being an invitee; rather a mere possible or indirect
economic benefit was sufficient. Thus garbage collectors, water

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1964

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 11

1964]

CASE COMMENTS

meter readers, and even tax collectors, were classified as invitees.
Anderson & Nelson Distilling Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196, 44 S.W.
658 (1898); Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works, 159 Mass. 311, 34
N.E. 523 (1893); Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28, 14 N.E. 921
(1888). However, when the injured party was a fireman, or, as in
the instant case, a policeman, the courts have with few exceptions
held these individuals to be no more than licensees. Since the work
of the police or fireman would certainly confer an economic benefit
upon the landowner equal to that bestowed by the tax collector, the
distinction is based upon the grounds that collectors, inspectors,
postmen, etc., come upon the premises at regular hours and intervals,
by the usual entrances, and thus their coming is to be reasonably
expected. The policeman or fireman may enter at odd hours and
by unusual means; therefore, to charge the owner with the duty to
prepare for such irregular visits would place too great a burden on
property owners. PROSSER, op. cit. supra § 78, Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d
1205 (1962).
Some writers and judges expressed dissatisfaction with the strict
early rule. One view was that the basis for distinction, though
basically sound, could be modified in some situations. In Meiers v.
Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920), the court
took the position that if a fireman does enter the premises by the
usual entrances open to the public, he should be given the same protection as the business invitee. This holding was cited with approval
in 69 U. PA. L. REv. 142, 237, 340, (1921) and 35 MIcH. L. REv.
1157 (1937), in which both writers agreed that regarding usual
means of entrance the property owner already owed a duty to
someone, so it would not be increasing the property owner's burden
to include the fireman in the protection afforded to the business
visitor when the fireman arrives at the usual entrances. The
Pennsylvania law review comment did emphasize that it would be
a mistake to give the fireman invitee status on all parts of the premises
since this would be requiring too much of the property owner. A
recent New York case involving a policeman re-affirmed the modification theory set forth in the Meiers decision. Larson v. FirstNat'l
Bank, 37 Misc. 2d 678, 236 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See
PROSSER op. cit. supra § 78.
Even without any deviation from the strict rule, it has been recognized that in certain situations the circumstances will be such that
the injured party is obviously an invitee. For example, a city fireman
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answering a call outside the city limits was treated as an invitee in
Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646
(1922). In another case, a police officer who was injured while
standing guard outside a stadium to prevent fights was held an
invitee because he was there at the express request of university
officials. Leahy v. State, 46 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1944). The
expressed invitation also was the deciding point for a similar holding
in Williams v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 176 Okla. 465, 56 P.2d 815
(1936).
Presently, in jurisdictions which have encountered the problem,
only one state, Illinois, has rejected the licensee concept and given
the police and firemen invitee status. The Illinois court in Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960), felt that times had
changed since the establishment of the common-law rule and that
stare decisis alone was not sufficient reason to maintain an out-dated
view.
In earlier comments on the question, it has been urged by several
writers that the police and firemen should be declared invitees in
all instances, apparently on no other grounds than the social "injustice" implied by excluding them from the protection given to other
public servants, and regardless of the increased burden on the landowner. 35 MicH L. REv., supra, 2 Mo. L. Rav. 110 (1937). Also,
a writer in 22 MINN. L. REv. 898 (1938), appeared to advocate a
flexible rule applicable to each case, in which the visitor's status would
be determined by: (1) the benefit accruing to the owner, and (2) the
foreseeability of the visitor's presence at the particular situs of the
injury.
In the principal case, the Ohio court discussed the social aspects
inherent in the established majority rule-specifically the idea of
possible "unfairness" in making the policeman bear the burden of
a loss suffered through no fault of his own. But, said the court, the
Ohio legislature had made a moot point of the question because
policemen and firemen had been included in the Ohio workmen's
compensation coverage, thus shifting the burden of loss to all taxpayers. A dissenting judge argued that workmen's compensation
coverage should have no effect on an injured party's right to recover
from a wrong-doer. (The same dissent protested the absurdity of
treating a tax collector or safety inspector as a business guest while
excluding a policeman from that category.)
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has apparently not
been presented with a case similar to the case at bar. Without the
sometimes restrictive bonds of precedent, West Virginia would be
free to adopt the reasonable New York view, which appears to best
satisfy the problem of balancing property and personal interest.
Victor Alfred Barone

ABSTRACTS
Federal Courts-Abstention Doctrine-Preserving Right to
Federal Determination of Constitutional Issue
Ps, graduates of schools of chiropractic, sought to practice in
Louisiana without complying with the educational requirements of
the Louisiana Medical Practice Act. LA. STAT. ANN. Trr. 37, §§
1261-1290 (1952). Ps brought this action against D in the federal
district court for an injunction and a declaration that the Act violated
the fourteenth amendment. The district court refused to hear the
case until the state court could determine the applicable issues of
state law. Ps submitted all the legal issues, both state and federal,
to the state court. The state intermediate appellate court held that
the Act applied to chiropractors and, as applied to Ps, it did not
violate the fourteenth amendment. Ps attempted to return the proceedings to the federal district court but the district court upheld D's
motion that the courts of Louisiana had passed on the federal issues
raised, and thus the proper remedy was by appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The district court should rule
on the merits of whether the Act violated the fourteenth amendment.
Although Ps submitted their claims to the state court for decision,
Ps did not forego their right to return to the federal district court
when Ps' actions were based on a mistaken view that they were
required to litigate their federal claims in the state court. England v.
LouisianaState Bd. of Medical Examiners, 84 Sup. Ct. 461 (1964).
One of the biggest problems that has arisen is the subsequent
course of a case once the abstention doctrine has been applied. In
theory the doctrine does not involve the abdication of federal jurisdition but only the postponement of its exercise until the state issues
are determined. Harrisonv. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1958). Frequently, the complaining party, after the abstention doctrine has
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